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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The three above entitled eases w&e consolidated for 
trial and one set of Findings of Fact, ·Oonclus~ons of Law, 
and Decree was entered. The only case in which Gerald 
Fowkes, Elma Tietjen Fowkes, Heber J. Fowkes and John 
L. Fowkes are parties is ,case number 3770, and they com-
prise all of the plaintiffs in that ·case. This brief, there-
fore is in answer to those portions of the brief of appellant 
Ctwrent Creek Irrigation Company, and appellant OrvH 
Andrmvs, et al, which apply to Case Number 3770. 
We will endeavor to follow the same designation of 
parties herein as is set rorth in the Appellants' Brief, i. e., 
in ·Case Number 3770, plaintiff and cross appellants, Gerald 
Fowkes, and Elma Tietjen Fowkes, his wife, Heber J. 
Fowkes, and John L. Fowkes will :be collectively referred 
to as "Fowkes"; defendant and appellant ·Current Creek 
Irrigation Company will be referred to as the "Irrigation 
Company'', and defendants and appellants, Orvil Andrews, 
Neldon V. Andrews, R. Delos Andrews, Eldon Vemess An-
drews, Oral Calvert Taylor, and Laveda A. Taylor, will be 
collectively referred to as ''Andrews''; defendant and· re~. 
spondent Joseph M. Tracy, State Engineer of the State of 
Utah, will be referred to as "State Engineer"; defendant, 
Utah Water and Power Board, will be refe,rred to as "Wa-
ter and Power Board". With respect to the designation of 
the record, we will refer to the large transcript of the pro-
ecedings in Case Number 3770, as (R. ___ ), and to the 
small tran..c;;;cript of the proceedings in Case Nwnber 3770, 
held on Oetuber 3, 19rs·6, relative to 1h.e preUminary injunc .. 
tion as (Vol. 2, P. ___ ). Other references will specifi-
cally designate the document. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In Case Number 3770, Fowkes sought the following 
relief: · 
(1) To enjoin the Irrigation Company and Water and 
Power Board from diverting and using water from one 16 
inch flowing well, and four 12 inch flowing wells (collec-
tively referred to herein as Irrigation Company Wells) sit-
uated near the approximate east shore area of the Mona 
Reservoir, in Juab County, and for damages sustained by 
Fowkes during the years 1955 and 1956, resulting from the 
operation of the Irrigation Company Wells. 
(2) To enjoin Andrews from diverting and using wa-
ter from a 16 inch pump well (referred to herein as An-
drews Pump Well) situated approximately % mile south-
easterly from FOW'kes' wells, and for damages sustained 
during the years 1955 and 1956, resulting from the opera-
tion m the Andrews Pump Well. 
( 3) To reverse and set aside the decision of the State 
Engineer in approving change application number a-2786, 
owned by the Irrigation Company, and Water and Power 
Board. 
The trial court enjoined Andrews from diverting wa-
,ter from the Andrews Ptnnp Well, and enjoined the Irri-
gation Company, and Water and Power Board from divert-
ing water from the five Irrigation Company flowing wells, 
unless and until Andrews and the Irrigation Company re-
placed to Fbwkes 1. 775 second feet of water during the 
irrigation season, and 27.11 gallons per minute of water 
during the non-irrigation season on the surface of the 
ground, and to plaintiff Gerald ·Fowkes, sufficient water to 
irrigate an additional ten acres of ground theretofore irri-
gated from a spring. Both Andrews and the Irrigation 
Company appeal from this ruling. The trial court found 
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3 
that Fowkes had been damaged $1500.00, but denied re-
covery thereof because it found Fowkes had a duty to miti-
gate their damages, and failed tn do so. Fowkes filed a 
cross appeal from rthe Findings of the trial court that ·Fowkes 
had a duty under the facts in this ~case 1Jo mitigate their 
damages and from the holding of the trial ·court that Fowkes 
are not entitled to recover their damages because of their 
failure to mitigate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Fowkes agree with the basic facts set forth in the re-
spective briefs of the Irrigation Company and Andrews 
insofar as they apply to Case Nmnber 3770, although 
Fowkes disagree with some of the conclusions appearing 
therein. We believe it more advisalble and less confusing 
to make a separate statement of facts mther than specify 
those with which we disagree and point out those that may 
or may not be supported only \by the evidence in Cases Nos. 
3763 and 3768, in which Fowkes were nQt parties. 
Fowkes are the owners of the right to the use of un-
derground water diverted by means of 11 flowing wells 
situated along Highway 91, approximately 4 miles nortih. 
of Mona, Utah. The rights to the use of underground wa-
ter from the 11 flawing wells are evidenced by the follow-
ing underground water claims filed in the State Engineer• 
Office (Frind.ing No. 3, Pages 166, 167; Pl. Ex. 1). 
3096 
3097 
3098 
3099 
3108 
3109 
Priority 
1912 
1914 
1918 
1920 
1907 
1912 
Flow of Dia. of 
Water 
70 GPM 
60 GPM 
50 GPM 
50 GPM 
5 GPM 
2 GPM 
Well 
6-in. 
6-in. 
3-in. 
3-in. 
2-in. 
2-in. 
Depth 
90ft. 
75ft. 
90 ft .. 
90 ft. 
75ft. 
16 ft. 
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4392 
' 4393 
104to· 
10471 
10472 
1915 
1920 
1918 
. 1922 
1918 
5 GPM 6-in.. 150 ft. 
5 GPM 2-in. 240 ft. 
175 GPM 6-in. 67 ft. 
200 GPM 6-in. 67 ft. 
175 GPM 6-in. 68 ft. 
797 GPM = 1.775 CFS 
In addition to the foregoing, Gerald Fowkes is the own-
er of the right to the use of water from a spring situated 
on his property to irrigate 10 acres of land (Finding No. 
6, P. 167; R. 77, 84, 91, 118, 119). 
Andrews are the owners of the right to the use of the 
water from a number of flowing wells evidenced by under-
ground water claims filed in the State Engineer's Office, 
as set forth on page 5 of their brief. Andrews also have 
initiated the right to appropriate underground water under 
Application No. 21443, by means of a 16 inch diameter pump 
well (referred to herein as Andrews Pump Well) and Appli-
cation No. 21444 by means of a well not yet drilled, as set 
forth on page 5 of their brief. In addition ·thereto, Andrews 
are the owners of the right to the use of water from a cer-
tain spring situated on their property for irrigation pur-
poses as set forth on page 5 of their brief. 
The Irrigation Company has initiated the right to ap-
propriate 18 second feet of underground water under Ap-
plication No .. 22760, from three wells and as amended by 
Change Application No. a-2786, from five wells as outlined 
on pages 6 ·and 7 of Andrews' brief. Under Application No. 
22760, as amended by Change Application No. a-2786, the 
Irrigation Company diverts underground water by means 
of its wells during the entire year, i. e., from January·! to 
December 31, and stores the water so diverted in a surface 
reservoir, known as Mona Reservoir, from which the wa-
ter is released from April 1 to November 1, together with 
oth~~ water stored in the reservoir, and conveyed a distance 
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5 
of approximately twelve miles, where it is used for irriga-
tion purposes (Pl. Ex. "E", ,Case Number 3763). 
The Andrews Pump Well was drilled in 1951, and was 
pumped during the period shown on pages 22 and 23 of An-
drews' brief, and during the practically entire irrigation 
season of 1956, as shown on Pl. Ex. P8 and P9. The five 
Irrigation Company Flowing Wells we~re drilled during the 
years 1951 and 1954, on the respective dates shorwn on page 
6 of Andrews' brief, and water was continuously diverted 
therefrom during the whoJe of each and every year with 
the e~ception of a few isolated times during the period of 
November, 1955, to June, 1956 (Complaint Par. 13, P. 4, 5; 
Answer Par. 5, P. 25,). 
All of the wells in question are situated on an alluvial 
fan running from east to west from the Wasatch Range of 
mountains in North Juab Valley. There are many of such 
alluvial fans along the Wasatch front in the valley. The 
valley is bounded on the east hy the precipitous and rugged 
Wasatch Mountains culminating in Mount Nebo, which pro. 
jects to an elevation of 11,887 feet above sea level and tow-
ers 7,000 feet above the center of the valley less than five 
miles distant (Pl. Ex. 2) . The valley constitutes a struc-
tural trough and is bounded on the north by a relatively 
low natural dike and on the south by the Levan Ridge. The 
areal extent of the artesian basin is relatively small and is 
embraced by the alluvial fan in which the wells are located. 
The Irrigation Company Wells are situated along the toe 
of the alluvial fan (R. 159). The Fowkes flowing wells are 
situated higher up on the fan (R. 151, 152, Pl. Ex. 2), and 
the Andrews Pump Well 1s situated higher on the :ean ap-
proximately one-half mile southeasterly from the Fowkes 
Wells (R. 189; Vol. 2, P. 17). The FOIW'kes flowing wells and 
the Irrigation Company flowing wells are interconnected, 
and the Fowkes flowing wells and the Andrews Pump Well 
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are interconnected (Vol. 2, P. 28, 30, R. 156). The drilling 
and use of water from the Andrews Pump Well and from 
the Irrigation Company flowing wells have jnterferred with 
and have interrupted the flow of water from the Fowkes 
flowing wells, and the spring of Gerald Fowkes (Fmding 
No. 12, P. 168). The foregoing is conclusively established 
by the evidence (P. Ex. 5, 6, P 8, P9; Vol. 2, P. 24 to 32; 
R. 14, 15; 155, 156, 172, 173, 189, 197). The Irrigation 
Company admits the foregoing to ~be the fact on pages 7, 
8, and 9 of their brief. The hydrostatic pressure in Fowkes 
flowing wells decreased from approximately 11.5 feet above 
the ground surface, at the beginning of 1953 (Pl. Ex. 5) 
to approximately 8.5 feet below the groWld surface on Oc-
tober 6, 1956 (Ex. CC-2, Case No. 3763), or a total decrease 
of 20 feet. The total reduction in hydrostatic head is sub-
stantially the Same for all of the old flowing wells (R. 35). 
The principal source of supply for Fowkes wells is from 
the drainage of the mountains to the east (Vol 2, P. 62; 
R. 21, 43, 151, 152) and that any development of under-
ground water in the Nephi Area being approximately 10 
riiiles south of the wells in question (Vol. 2, P. 62) could 
not materially affect the Fowkes wells (R. 21, 28, 44, 159, 
168, 196). Prior to the diversion of water by means of the 
Andrews Pump Well and the Irrigation Company Wells, 
the Fowkes wells had never stopped flowing, even during 
the drouth years of 1934 and 1935 (Ex. P12; Vol. 2, P. 64; 
R. 77). The withdrawal of undergronnd water during the 
year 1956 caused a total reduction in the ground water sur-
face, as shown by the hydrographs on well number 10639, 
from minus 1.9 feet on December 31, 1955 (Pl. Ex. 6A), 
to minus 5.83 feet on Decetnber 31, 1956 (Ex. CC2, Case 
Nwnber 3763, or a net reduction of 3.93 feet. In the opin· 
ion of the expert witnesses, Gardner and Hansen, the 
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7 
present rate of withdrawal was exceeding the present rate 
of rechcurge (R. 54, 69, 70; R. 202). 
The trial court found that Fowkes suffered a pecuniary 
loss for crops not grown, and for hauling water during the 
period in controversy, in the sum of $1500.00 (Finding No. 
16, P. 169). The evidence adequately supports the for&-
going Finding (R. 75-88, incl.; 107-116 incl.; 132-140 incl.). 
The trial court further found that F1owkes could have miti-
gated their damages by taking the necessary steps to se-
cure water which was still available from the underground 
basin during the existence of this controversy, and by rea-
son thereof Fowkes are not entitled to claim damages for 
loss of crops and for hauling water (Finding 16, P. 169). 
Mr. J. S. Lee, a well driller, who drilled the five Irrigation 
Company wells and the Andrews Pump Well (R. 208), tes-
tified that it would require one twelve inch well approxi-
mately 300 feet deep to produce approximately 800 gallons 
per minute, being the approximate total amount (797 GPM) 
to which the Fowkes are entitled (R. 211, Pl. Ex. l) . The 
cost to drill such a well would be $14.00 per foot or $4200.00 
(R. 211). In addition thereto, it would cost approximately 
$3500.00 to equip the well with a pump suitaJble to lift the 
water (R. 213). The combined cost for drilling such a well, 
plus equipping the same with a suitable pump would be 
$7,700.00. In addition thereto, there would fbe the cost of 
the suitaJble transformer and the! cost of pumping. The 
Fowkes wells consist of six 6 inch diameter casings, two 3 
inch diameter casings, and three 2 inch diameter casings 
(Pl. Ex. 1). Mr. Lee testified that it would cost approxi-
mately $750.00 for each pump for each 6 inch well (R. 213). 
He further testified that it would cost aJpproximately $250.00 
to equip each domestic well with a pump (R. 216). In ad-
dition thereto, each 6 inch well would have to be pump tes-
ted to determine the draw down and size of pumping equip-
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at $200.00 per well, or a total m $1200.00 (R. 224). The 
total east to equip such wells with adequate pumps would 
be $6,95q.oo, according 1Jo the testimony of Mr. Lee. Ac-
cording to the testimony of Mr. Madsen, as is demonstrated 
by Ex. W20, 1:Jhe ~cost to equip a 6 inch well with a pump, 
motor a.I).d transformer would be $1015.00 per well (Ex. 
W20; R. 233). Ex:hibit W20 further shows that the cost 
to equip one 4 inch well with a motor and transformer would 
be $812.00 to pump 60 gallons per minute with a 50 foot 
lift. Using the figures of Mr. Madsen, the total cost to 
equip the 6 inch wells with adequate facilities would be 
$6090.00, and the cost to equip the two 3 inch wells would 
be $1624.00. The cost to equip the three 2 inch wells, us-
ing the figures of Mr. Lee, would be $750.00. The total cost, 
therefore, to equip Fowkes wells with adequate facilities 
would be $8464.00. The trial court therefore rules in ef-
fect that Fowkes had a duty to expend between $6950.00 
and $8464.00, to mitigate $1500.00 damages. From this rul-
ing, the Fowkes filed their cross appeal (Cross Appeal and 
Statement of Points, Page 188). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
We shall follow the general order of the points desig-
nated in Appellant Irrigation Company's brief, although 
our statement of points may be couched in somewhat dif-
ferent language. We shall separately discuss Point 6 of 
Appellants Andrews' brief, set forth· on page 16 thereof, 
and designated herein as Point No. 4~ The other pointS 
raised by appellant Andrews do not present any contro-
versy between Fowkes and Andrews. Fowkes desire to 
present two additional points, which are combined into 
Point 5 herein, and will be fully discussed hereafter. We 
shall endeavor to cover each point in the order enwnerated. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT UNDER- THE APPR,OPRIATIONS OF UNDE·R-
GROUND WATER BY PLAINTIFFS FO,WKES IN CASE 
NO. 3770, THE ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT TO, USE 
ARTESIAN PRESSURE AS THEIR MEANS OF DIVER-
SION. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING ITS 
ORDER REQUIRING REPLACEMENT OF THE WATER, 
IN THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THE 
QUANTITY OF WATER APPROPRIATED BY THE VA-
RIOUS PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NUMBER 3770, 
TO SUPPO·RT THE ORDER FO·R REPLACEMENT. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING THE 
IRRIGATION COMPANY AND ANDREWS TO EACH 
REPLACE HALF THE WATED. AND THERE IS EVI-
DENCE IN THE RECO'RD TO SUPPORT AN APPOR-
TIONMENT OF REPLACEMENT COST, AND THE 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN OO·NCLUDING THAT THE 
ONLY CAUSE FO,R DIMUNITION IN THE PLAINTIFF'S 
WELL WAS INTERFERENCE BY ANDREWS AND 
THE IRRIGATION CO,MPANY. 
POINT IV 
'!'HE DECREE OF TIIE TRIAL COURT INSOFAR 
AS IT AWARDED· INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND OR-
DERED REPLACEMENT TO FOWKES WAS PROPER. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINA-
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TIO'N THAT UNDER THE FACTS OF TillS CASE 
FOWKES HAD A DUTY TO MITIGATE THEIR DAM-
AGES AND IN HOLDING THAT FOWKES ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR D:AMAGES FOR LOSS 
OF CROPS AND FOR HAULING WATER BECAUSE 
THEY FAILED TO MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT UND~R THE APPRO·PRIATIONS OF UNDER-
GROUND WATER BY PLAINTIFFS FOWKES IN CASE 
NO. 3770, THEY ACQUffiED A VESTED RIGHT TO USE 
ARTESIAN PRESSURE AS THEIR MEANS OF DIVER-
SION. 
In Point No. 1 of appellant Irrigation Company's brief, 
it is stated that the trial court held that Fowkes have a 
vested right to have artesian pressure and ground water 
levels maintained at such an elevation to pennit them to 
get their water through their shallow existing wells with-
out pwnping. The trial court did not so hold. The trial 
court did hold that Fowkes had made valid appropriations 
of the underground waters by means of artesian pressure 
and that under their appropriations they acquired a vested 
right to use the artesian pressure as their means of diver-
sion which would be protected as against subsequent ap-
propriators. The trial court did not hold that Fowkes had 
an absolute vested right to have the artesian conditions 
preserved, but held that since the artesian conditions in 
the Fowkes wells had been destroyed by the combined op-
erations of the Irrigation Company wells and the Andrews 
Pump Well, the Fowkes means of diversion had been im-
paired and ·rendered useless. The Irrigation Company and 
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Andrews were ordered to replace the water to Fowkes on 
the surface of the ground and that any expense incurred 
in altering the Fowkes means of diversion to obtain such 
water must be borne equally by the Imgation Company 
and Andrews. The Irrigation Company 'Was enjoined from 
operating its five flowing wells, and Andrews were enjoined 
from operating their pump well unless and until replace-
ment of the water to Fowkes is made. We submit that the 
holding of the trial court was proper, and is in accordance 
with the principles of law as pronounced time and time again 
by this Court. 
The Irrigation Company and Andrews both admit that 
Fowkes have made valid appropriations of underground 
water by means of their wells, although the Irrigation Com-
pany argues under Point 11 of its brief, that Fowkes failed 
to prove the quantity of water to which they are entitled. 
The latter will be covered separately under Point No. n 
herein. 
The basic issue presented by this appeal, therefore, 
becomes whether the prior appropriators of underground 
water, who made their appropriations prior to 1935, by us-
ing artesian pressure as their means of diversion, acquired 
a vested right to use artesian pressure as their means of 
diversion. When, as here, the artesian pressure has been 
reduced by diversions of junior appropriators so as to ren-
der the means of diversion of rfhe prior appropriators use-
less, the issue becomes one of who, as between the prior 
appropriators and the junior apropriators, must bear the 
expense replacing the water to the prior appropriators. If 
the prior appropriators acquired a vested right to use ar-
tesian pressure to divert his wateT, then the junior appropri-
ators should bear the e~nse. If not, the prior appropri-
artors must bear the expense. 
The evidence is conclusive that the diversion of water 
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by means of the Irrigation Company flowing wells and the 
Andrews Pump We~l have ·caused the Fowkes wells to cease 
flowing. There is no dispute that as against the Irrigation 
Company flowing wells and the Andrews Pump Well, 
Fowkes .have the prior right to· the use of the underground 
water .. Andrews do not dispute that Fowkes acquired a 
vested right to use artesian pressure as the means of their 
diversion. In fact, Andrews assert the same right in their 
flowing wells as against the Irrigation Company. Insofar 
as Fowkes are concerned, the diSpute resolves itself .into 
one between Fowkes and the Irrigation Company. 
We call attention to the fact that the Fowkes wells are 
used for irrigation, domestic and stock watering purposes 
from which 1.775 sec. ft. of water are diverted as compared 
to the 2.74 second feet of water diverted by means of the 
Inigation Company's flowing wells. The priorities of. the 
Fowkes wells run from .1907 to 1922, whereas the priorities 
of the Irrigation Company's flowing wells are as late as 
1951. We here emphasize the fact that the dispute between 
Fowkes and the Irrigation .Gompany is a flowing well vs. 
flowing well controversy. The Irrigation Company has de-
pleted the artesian pressure in the Fowkes wells, and have 
in effect taken that very same artesian pressure to divert 
their water from their five flowing wells. In face of this 
fact, the Irrigation Company asserts that it has done no 
wrong and if Fowkes want their water, they should be re-
quired to install pumping facilities at their own ~ 
and bear the perpetual cost of ptunping, while the Irriga-
tion Company utilizes the very same artesian pressure 
which it has taken away from Fowkes to divert its water 
without any cost to it whatever. We shall demonstrate in 
the following argument that the position of the Irrigation 
Company is untenable and is contrary to the established 
principles ot law. 
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It is well settled in Utah that on a surface stream if 
a subsequent appropriator were to lower the level of the 
water of a stream, so that the size of the stream which was 
diverted into a prior appropriator diverting works was 
greatly diminished and he was thereJby put to an additional 
~ in order to olbtain his water, the subsequent ap-
propriator would certainly be liable for the added expense 
which he caused to the prior appropriator. Salt Lake City 
vs. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 147. In the Gardner case, 
supra, the defendant filed an application to appropriate wa-
ter from Utah Lake by pumping directly from the lake. 
Plaintiffs had appropriated watoc from the lake which in 
part naturally flowed through the outlet and in part were 
pumped. Defendant's diversion of water would lessen the 
natural flow and increase the pumping lift of plaintiffs. 
There was a large quantity of water in the bottom of the 
lake ,which had not :been appropriated by plaintiffs, either 
by natural flow or pumping. This Court ordered the ap-
plication of defendant approved, but required defendant to 
stand all the expense resulting to plaintiffs by diverting 
the additional water. 
On page 152 it was stated: 
"We think the original taker or appropriator from a 
stream or body of water also acquires the right to con-
tinue to use his method or means of diverting which 
he has installed.'' 
After ctiscussing who should bear the expense of any 
change in the prior appropriators' diverting works, this 
Court stated on page 152 as foJ.lows: 
"• • • If it be held, therefore, that a subsequent ap-
propriator of water need have no regard for the di-
verting means or methods of the prior appropriatm-, 
but may in fact or effect make prior appropriations of 
water unavailable with impunity, then there is in fact 
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no su~h a rig~t as a prior right~ but all rights may, at 
any time, be mvaded or destroyed by a subsequent ap-
propriator by simply making the diverting means used 
by the prior appropriator useless. To permit such 
an invasion of a prior right would, in effect, amount to 
an indirect taking of a prior appropriator's water. This, 
neither the legislative nor the judicial power can allow 
without permitting confiscation of property rights." 
On page 153 it is further stated: 
"' ' ' If all rights can be protected and preserved, a 
mere change in prior established means or meth-
ods of diversion, if possible, ought not to prevent the 
use of water which could otherwise not be beneficially 
applied. But, in our judgment, the risk of interferring 
with prior rights and the cost of any change in the 
prior appropriator's means or methods of diversion 
should be assumed and borne by the subsequent ap-
propriator, and a court should in no cru;e permit a sub-
sequent appropriation unless all prior rights can by 
some feasible means be protected and maintained." 
Although the waters involved in the Gardner case were 
surface waters, there is in fact no distinction between th:e 
Gardner case and the instant case. As a matter of fact, 
Utah Lake would probably represent the most simple type 
of underground water basin, different only in that the 
body of water exists independently from the interwoven 
stratum of sands and gravel. 
All waters in this State, whether above or under the 
ground, are declared to be the property of the public, sub-
ject to all existing rights to the use thereof (73-1-1, UCA 
1953). The Court is well aware of the confusion and chaos 
which existed prior to 1935, in attempting to apply a dif-
ferent set of principles of la\V to surface water from those 
applied to underground water. Since 1935, there has been 
no statutory distinction between swface and underground 
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water or in the application by the courts of the principles 
of law with respect thereto. The principles of law atr 
nounced by this Court in the Gardner case, supra, apply 
wiith equal vigor to underground water, and the facts of 
the instant case come squarely Within the principles an-
nounced therein. 
Prior to 1935, the decisions of this Court treated the 
water of artesian basins as peroolating water, and as such 
were owned by the owner of the ground where such waters 
were located as an incident to the ownm-ship of the ground, 
and were not considered to be subject to appropriation. 
Since such basins occupied subterranean areas, in which 
there could be many owners, such that one owner could, by 
withdrawing more than his share of the water of the basin, 
deprive others of their proportionate share, this Court rec-
ognized the need for regulation, and for that purpose adop-
ted what is known as the Doctrine of Correlative Rights. 
Horne vs. utah Oil Refining Company, 59 Utah 279, 202 
P. 815, 31 ALR, 883; Glover vs. Utah Oil Refining Oom-
pany, 62 Utah 174, 218 P. 955, 31 ALR 900. The Horne 
case, supra, was decided in 1921, and was recognized as 
the law of this Staf.e until the decision of Wrathall vs. John-
son, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d, 755, wherein it was held that the 
law of appropriation applies to the waters of subterranean 
and artesian hasins. 
The Wrathall case was an action for damages and for 
injunctive relief.. The complaint alleged that for 35 years 
plaintiff had two, 2 inch flowing wells which had continu-
ously delivered to the surface of the ground 15 gallons of 
water per minute, and which pl.ainitill had beneficially used 
for irrigation, domestic and culinary purposes. During 
the fall and winter of 1927 ,and 1928, the defendant drilled 
two 4 inch wells on the adjoining land into the same arte-
sian basin, and in the month of July, 1929, defendants in-
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stalled an electric pump on one of their wells and pumped 
180 gallons per minute theTefrom. It was further alleged 
that thereafter plaintiff's wells decreased in flow and event-
ually ·ceased flowing entirely. The trial court sustained a 
demurrer to the complaint, so the question on appeal was 
whether the complaint stated a cause of action. This Court 
held that the complaint did state a cause of action, and the 
case was remanded to the trial court to hear the evidence. 
Justice Moffat wrote the rmlln opinion, and Justice Ephraim 
Hansen concurred without comment. Chief Justice Straup 
conCU.ITed in a separate opinion. Although concurring with 
the results, Justice Elias Hansen and Justice Folland wrote 
vigorous and exhaustive dissenting opinions. 
On page 777, Justice Moffat stated as follows: 
"* * * To permit an adjoining land owner to drive a 
well and by natural flow or by pmnping or otherwise 
dry up a neighbor's well_that had been driven and used 
for over 35 years invades the rights of the neighbor, 
destroys his prior appropriation, injures his vested and 
'recognized· right, is actionable, or, if not, he whose 
· right is thus invaded may still pray for rain, and unless 
Providence be kinder than courts of law, he is without 
remedy." (Emphasis ours). 
It is here pointed out that in the Wrathall case the 
complaint alleged a reduction in the hydrostatic pressure 
of plaintiff's wen until eventually it stopped flowing. It 
did not allege that defendant had exhausted plaintiff's 
source of supply, although the complaint did allege that if 
defendants were permitted to continue the opera.tion of 
their pumps,, defendants would eventually exhaust the sup-
ply from the artesian basin. 
. Chief Justice Straup, in his concurring opinion, was 
of the opinion that the complaint stated a cause of action 
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under either the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation, or Cor-
relative Rights. On page 790 he pointed out: 
"• * * That he by artificial means drilled a pipe and 
tapped the waters of the artesian basin, and thereby 
brought them to the surface by natural and normal 
pressure, and, as here, for 35 years, under claim of 
right, openly diverted and beneficially used such wa-
ters, he, in principle, as it seems to me,, equally acquired 
a prior right to all such waters so diverted and bene-
ficially used by him, which may not be disturbed or in-
terferred with or diminished by any subsequent claim-
ant to the extent of depriving or preventing him of the 
use of such water so acquired and enjoyed, at least not 
without restoring or otherwise furnishing him at the 
orifice of his well, at the expense of such claimant, 
waters from the basin in quantity and quality as there-
tofore diverted and used by him from his well." (Em-
phasis ours). 
Although the opinion in the Wrathall case was very 
lengthy, the ,Court did not define the relief to which plain-
tiff was entitled, since the only issue raised on the appeal 
was Whether or not the demurrer to the oomplaint should 
be sustained. In Justesen vs. Olsen, 86 Uta:h 158, 40 P. 2d, 
802, decided one week later, the Court was more explicit. 
In the Justesen ease, plaintiff in 1889 drove six wells and 
in 1901 drilled an additional wen on his land, all of which 
had a combined flOMT of 7 galLons per minute. There had 
always existed some small springs on plaintiff's land. In 
1916 defendants drove a few flowing wells on their property 
with no noticeable effect on plHintiff's springs and wells. 
In August, 1B27, defendant drilled a large pump well with-
in 500 yards of plaintiff's wells and springs, and installed 
a pump and diverted from 525 to 900 gallons pe,r minute. 
There was a direct connection between plaintiff's wells and 
defendant's pump well, the latter interferring with the flow 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
of plaintifrs well. This CoW"t held that plaintiff ·had a ves-
ted right to divert his water by means of artesian pressure, 
and was entitled to an injunction enjoining Hnd restraining 
the defendant from operating his pump well when the 
flow of plaintiff's well was less than 7 gallons per minute. 
In a separate ·concurring opinion, Chief Justice Straup 
stated the right of the prior appropriator must be protected, 
but instead of enjoining the subsequent appropriator he 
should be permitted to replace to the prior appropriator 
at the orifice of his well waters from the basin undimin-
ished in quantity and quality as theretofore appropriated 
by him to the extent that his waters may be diminished 
by the pumping of the subsequent appropriator. 
Thus, it is clear under the decisions of the Wrathall 
and Justeson cases that the means of diversion of prior ap-
propriators from underground artesian basins will be pro-
tected by the courts. Both cases involved an invasion of 
the right of the prior appropriator by reducing the artesian 
pressure below the swface of the ground and thereby caus-
ing his well to cease flowing. There can be no room for 
doubt that the Wrathall case stands for the proposition that 
an interference with the means of diversion by artesian 
pressure by a subsequent appropriator is actionable. The 
Justeson case stands for the proposition that injunctive re-
lief is a proper remedy against such interference by a sub-
sequent appropriator. 
All of the opinions in the Wrathall and Justeson cases 
frankly recognize that prior to that time neither the Court, 
the State Engineer's Office, nor the bar or public generally 
had construed the then existing statutes to cover under-
ground water in artesian basins. The various opinions in 
view of this fact suggested various legislative changes in 
law. Accordingly, the legislature did amend and enact 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
laws to meet the changes. The Laws of Utah, 1935, pages 
195 to 200, Chapter 105. 
It is .particularly noted that as a direct result of the 
ooncwTing opinions of Chief Justice Straup in the Wrathall 
and Justesoo cases, Section 73-3-23, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, was enaated and reads as follows: 
"In all cases of appropriation of underground water 
the right of replacement is hereby ·granted to any jnn-
ior appropriator whose appropriation may diminish the 
quantity or injuriously affect the quality of appropri-
ated underground water in which the right to the use 
thereof has ,been established as provided :by law. No 
replacement may be made until application in writing 
has been made to and approved by the State Engineer. 
In all cases replacements shall be at rthe sole cost and 
expense of the applicant and subject to such rules and 
regulations as the State Engineer may prescribe. The 
right of eminent domain is !hereby granted to any ap-
plicant for the puvpose of replacement as provided here-
in.'' 
The enactment of the focegoing statute clearly reflects 
the intent of the legislature to protect the rights of the 
prior appropriators, including his means of diversion. This 
protection runs to his right to the ar.tesian pressure as a 
means of diverting his water. The most recent case which 
construed the 1935 amendments as they apply to the pro-
tection of the rights of a prior appropriator from an arte-
sian basin was Hanson vs. Salt Lake City, 115 Uta:h 404, 
205 P. 2d, 255. We believe that the Hanson case reilterates 
and reaffirms the principles of law set forth in the Wrath-
all and Justeson ·cases, as they are reflected by the compre-
hensive 1935 statutory amendments.. In that case Han-
son owned a well situated in Salt Lake Cou.nlty, aJbout 260 
feet deep, which flowed aJbout 50 gallons per minute. The 
water flowed from his well and operated a hyd~aulic ram 
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which lifted about 10% of the water into a tank, which was 
beneficially used, and 90% of the water was wasted. The 
city drilled a well about 1 ~ miles southeasterly from rthe 
Hanson well. The city well was about 500 feet deep, and 
was perforated along the entire casing to pick up water 
from all acquifers. A pump was installed on the city well, 
and it produced about 8 second feet of water. The well was 
pumped from August 21, 1934, to Ootober 17, 1934, and 
was operated some in 1935 and 1936. The pwnping of the 
city well caused the flow of Hanson's well to decrease from 
50 gallons per minute to about 4 gallons per minute. The 
reduced flow was insufficient to operate the hydraulic ram, 
and Hanson installed a pump on his well. The evidence was 
undisputed that the city well and the Hansen well tapped 
the same underground basin in which there were located 
approximately 6000 wells, flowing and pumped. The evi-
dence further showed that the only interference by the city 
well with the Hanson well occurred for a few months in 
1934 and the flow of his well never decreased below 4 
GPM. The trial court awarded Hanson damages and de-
rued the injunction. This Court reversed the judgment with 
directions to dismiss the complaint. The prevailing opin-
ion acknowledged Hanson's right to compensation for the 
alleged interference. Since the action was brought over 
13 years after the city ceased to pump its \Veil, during which 
time Hanson continued to use the pump on his well, the pre-
vailing opinion reasoned that the pump had some value to 
plaintiff's operation other than to overcome the effect of 
interference from defendant's well. It was pointed out that 
the pump was an improvement to his system which he had 
used for a period of about 13 years, although the city's 
pumping affected the flow of Hanson's well for a period of 
only a few months, and that the flow of his well never di-
minished beloW 4 G.P.M., It was for these two reasons 
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and these two reasons alone that this Court held Hanson 
was not entitled to recover his damages. 
On page 18 of the Irrigation Company's brief, it states 
that the Harison ease made the first major departure from 
the concept that a prior appvopriator got a vested right in 
pressure, stands for the principle that there is no vested 
right in an unreasonable means of diversion, and that the 
reason ·Hanson was denied recovery was because Hanson's 
means of diversion was unreasonable. They do not specify 
whether they mean that Hanson's method of diversion by 
artesian pressure in and of itself was unreasonable, or 
whether Hanson's use of the hydraulic ·ram, which wasted 
90% of the water diverted, was unreasonable. We submit 
that nowhere in the prevailing opinion of the Hanson case 
is it stated or even inferred that the means of diversion by 
artesian pressure in and of itself was unreasonable. In 
fact, we are convinced that the prevailing opinion ·recog-
nizes that the use of artesian pressure is an accepted, rea-
sonable means of diversion, and will be protected by the 
courts. We believe that the Irrigation Oompany completely 
ignores the reasoning by Mr. Justice Wade, and his pro-
nouncement o[ the correct principles of water law as they 
apply to the facts of that ·case. This becomes apparent 
when the oonclusion reached by the prmrailing opinion, 
speaking through Mr. Justice Wade, is read. On page 263 
he states: 
"We conclude that the waters of artesian basins are 
subject to appropriation in this state, and that the fi.rst 
appropriator obtains a prior right to the use of such 
water over subsequent appropriators, and that includes 
his means of diversion as long as such means are rea-
sonably efficient, and do not unreasonably waste water. 
It follows that where a subsequent appropriator draws 
a sufficient quantity of water out of an artesian basin 
to lower the static head pressure of a prior appropri-
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ator's well, so that additional costs are required to lift 
sufficient water from :his well to satisfy his previously 
established beneficial use of such waters, the subse-
quent appropriator must bear the additional expense." 
The Irrigation Company goes to great lengths in its 
brief in urging that this Court disregard the fundamental 
principle that the means of diversion of the prior appropri-
ator be protected. We believe that this principle is so in-
herent in the doctrine of appropriation, that any attempt 
to deviate therefrom will nndermine 1and destroy the cor-
nerstones upon which it is fonnded. In support of their ar-
gument, they rely upon the author Wells A. Hutchins, and 
quote extensively from his book "Selected Problems in the 
Law of Water Rights in the West.'' Every argument which 
they present in support of a deviation from this well settled 
rule was presented to this Court in the Hanson case, and 
was rejected as being unsound. 
The Irrigation Company argues that the State is inter-
ested in the fullest conservation and the highest develop-
ment and utilization of all of its water which is possible 
without endangering the supplies, and that if a subsequent 
appropriator in an artesian basin is required not only to lift 
his own water out of the basin, but to pay the added ex-
pense caused to all prior appropriators by lowering the 
static head pressure, then the cost to the SUJbsequent ap-
propriator will become prohibitive, and the waters of the 
basin cannot be developed and utilized to the extent that 
they could without depleting the supply. Mr. Justice Wade 
answers the foregoing argument in the Hanson case on page 
263 of the Pacific Reporter, by stating that if such rule pre-
vails then in many cases subsequent appropriators may 
draw the water out of the basin so the static head pressure 
is so low that the cost of bringing the water to the surface 
is prohibitive to the prior appropriator, and then the sub-
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sequent appropriator will be aJble to obtain all the water 
from the prior appropriator without paying a cent therefor. 
He then points out that in the Horne case, the Wrathall 
case and the Justeson case, the Court intervened to prevent 
such a result. In rejecting the suggested rule as being un-
solUld, Mr. Justice Wade gives approval rtJo the rule that the 
expense to a prior appvopriator caused by a subsequent ap-
propriator taking water from an artesian basin, and thereby 
lowering the static head pressure, must be borne by the sub-
sequent appropriator. On page 263 he states as follows: 
"* • • Such a rule gives proper reward rto the person 
who first discovers and develops the water and stabil-
izes his right, and is in harmony with the long estab-
lished policy of this state that a later appropriation 
may not interfere with the use of water by a prior ap-
propriation in the manner which he has become accus-
tomed to use such water." 
The Irrigation Company extensively argues that in the 
interest of serving the most people, each appropriator should 
make his appropriation with the understanding that his 
rights are subject to the static head pressure being lowered, 
and that when it is he must stand the expense of bringing 
his own water ,to the surface, and in that way only can the 
greatest development of the water of fue basin be obtamed. 
In support of the foregoing argument, the Irrigation Com-
pany quotes at length from the book written by Wells A. 
Hutchins, "Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights 
in the West." The very same argument was presented to 
this Court ·and rejected in the Hanson case. Mr. Justice 
Wade again squarely answered the foregoing argument in 
the Hanson case on page 262 of the Pacific Reporter, and 
pointed out that the suggestion that all appropriators un-
der this law would make their appropriartions with notice 
that when and if it 1became necessary in the opinion of the 
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State Engineer for the fullest utilization of the water to 
lower the ~static head pressure of the basin, then any ap. 
propriator would 'have to stand his own ~ occasioned 
thereby, is impossible because these appropriators' rights 
were estaJblished many years 'before his law ·was enacted. 
He then states: 
"Our 1935 water laws did not contemplate that the 
rights of prior appropriators would be limited as above 
suggested.'' 
Mr. Justice Wade then refers to Section 73-3-23, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, quoted ·above, and points out that 
under that statute the right of replacement is granted to 
any junior appropriator whose appropriation may diminish 
the quantity or injuriously affect the quality of the prior 
appropriated underground water, and replacement shall be 
at the sole cost and expense of the applicant. He then 
states: 
"This clearly indicates the legislative policy that later 
appropriators shall stand all the expense which such 
appropriation causes to prior appropriators." 
The Irrigation Company devotes a considerable por-
tion of its brief to its assertion that to maintain an artesian 
condition in an underground basin causes leaks and wast-
ing of water which can be saved and utilized by lowering the 
static head pressure. This Court has consistently permit-
ted a junior appropriator to appropriate water saved by 
constructing works designed to save the water wasted Lit-
tle Cottonwood Water Company vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 
289 P. 116. In none of those cases did this Court require 
or did the applicant even claim that he had a right to re-
quire the prior appropriator to pay the cost of that water 
saving. 
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The facts of the instant ease are almost identical with 
the facts of Wrath·all vs. Johnson, supra, and Justeson vs. 
Olson, >Supra, since the areal extent of the artesian basin 
is relatively small, and there are only a limited number of 
appropriators invoJved. Under the foregoing cases there 
can he no room f.or doubt that Fowkes' prior right to the 
use of the water, including their means of diversion iby ar-
tesian pressure, is protected. Hanson vs. Salt Lake City, 
supra, in no way tends to overrule either case, but expressly 
upholds and affirms the principles of law therein announced. 
Utah is the only state among those which have statu-
tory procedures which has a so-ealled replacement statute 
(73-3-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). Hutchins, supra, 
recognizes this and on page 176 states as follows: 
"The Utah Law covers all ground waters, and gives the 
junior appropriator the right of replacement of water, 
at his sole expense, if his proposed development will 
diminish the quantity or injuriously affect the quality 
of ground water already appropriated." 
The author of the law review article in 28 Rocky Moun-
tain Law Review, on page 379, also gives this point recog-
nition. On page 379, he states: 
"The Utah solution, perhaps the best so far, recognizes 
the right (to artesian pressure) , but allows the junior 
appropriator to lower the level if he pays the senior 
appropriator for any increased cost in bringing water 
to the surface." 
The overwhelming weight of authority in th~ other 
western states gives protection to the prior appr.opriators 
to continue his means of diversion (Pima Farms Company 
vs. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369; Noh vs. Stoner, 53 Ida-
ho 651, 26 P. 2d, 1112; City of Lodi vs. East Bay Munici-
pal Utility District, 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P. 2d, 439; Faden vs. 
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Hubbell, 93 Col. 358, 28 P. 2d, 247; Karl F. Hehl Engineer-
ing Co. vs. Hubbell, 132 Col. 96, 285 P. 2d 593; State Ex 
Rei Crowley vs. District Court, 108 Montana 89, 88 P. 2d, 
23; Annotation Appropriation of Water as Creating Right, 
as Against Subsequent Appropriator, to Continue Method or 
Means of Diversion, 121 ALR, 1044). It is noted that in the 
case of Crowley vs. District Court, 108 Montana 89, 88 P. 
2d 23, cited on page 27 of the Irrigation Company's brief, 
the Montana Court held that as against a subsequent ap-
propriator of water from a river, although a sufficient quan-
tity of water was left in the stream to which the prior ap-
propriator was entitled, the subsequent appropriator ·was 
required to stand the expense of altering and lowering the 
diversion works of the prior appropriator. The court sug-
gested that the rtest of reasonableness is determined by the 
standards in existence at the time of the original appropri-
ation and not at the time of the subsequent appropriation. 
The argument of the Irrigation Company, when 
stripped to its bare essentials, urges this Court to hold, as 
a matter of law, that diversion of water by means of arte-
sian pressure is in and of itself an unreasonable means of 
diversion. Under the facts of this case, we are at a loss to 
understand how the Irrigation Company can seriously con-
tend that Fowkes do not have a vested right to the artesian 
·pressure because such means of diversion is unreasonable, 
and still -contend that they have the right to take the very 
same pressure away from Fowkes and utilize it to divert 
their water. Certainly, if Fowkes' means of diversion by 
artesian pressure is unreasonable, so is the diversion by ar-
tesian pressure by defendants unreasonable. In addition 
thereto, the Irrigation Company wastes 50% Olf the water 
diverted :from the underground in transit and storage, ac-
cording to the testimony of David I. Gardner (R. 57-62). 
Although the trial court ordered this testimony stricken, 
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it deserved consid&ation in view of rthe position taken by the 
Irrigation Company. The contention of the Irrigation Com-
pany is best described by the old adage, "the pot ·calling the 
kettle black." 
The Irrigation Company then asserts that the Fowkes 
should be required to expend monies and labor to change 
their means of diversion, by installing pumps, motors, trans-
formers, and other pumping equipment at Fowkes' own ex-
pense and be perpetually burdened with the cost of pump-
ing, while the Irrigation Company diverts its water by ar-
tesian pressure, and should not be required to pay one red 
cent. To support its argument, the Irrigation Company 
asserts that for this Court to hold otherwise will ,require 
some farmer down in Milford to lift 40,000 acre feet of wa-
ter for the other farmers before he can get one acre foot 
for himself. Yet it completely ignores the great injus-
tice which would result in this case. It argues that it would 
oost the subsequent appropriator so much that he shouldn't 
pay anything. We submit that not one reason which they 
cite in support of their argument exists in this case. We 
do not here have a fact situation where the ground water 
basin covers an areal extent of 90 square miles and where 
there are 125 irrigation wells annually pumping 40,000 acre 
feet of water. Nor do we have a greatly populated area 
in which there are 6000 wells located within a small radius. 
We do not have a fact situation which would make it eco-
nomically impractical for the Irrigation Company to lift 
its water and Fowkes' water too, since the fact is that the 
Irrigation Company gets its water 1by artesian pressure 
without any lift or cost whatever. Nor do we have a fact 
situation where the prior appropriator has a small well flow-
ing only a few gallons per minute, but the Fowkes wells are 
in the main irrigation wells with a combined flow of 1.775 
second feet, as compared to 2.74 second feet of combined 
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flow from the liTigation Company wells. We do have a 
relatively small alluvial fan with artesian conditions where-
by the artesian pressure in the Fowkes wells has been de-
pleted by the Irrigation Company wells, and that very same 
artesian pressure is used by the Irrigation Company to di-
vert its water. We emphasize that this dispute is a flowing 
well vs. flowing well controversy, and the main issue is as 
between the prior appropriator and the junior appropria-
tor of water by artesian pressure; who is going to stand 
the expense of ehanging the means of diversion of the prior 
appropriator which has been rendered useless by the act af 
the subsequent appropriator. We submit that justice and 
fair play dictates that such expense must be borne by the 
subsequent appropriator and is in harmony with the well 
established principle, as announced time and time again by 
this Court, that the means of diversion of the prior approp-
riator shall be protected. 
Although we have dwelled on this point longer than 
we anticipated, we would make this further observation. 
If the rule asserted by the Irrigation Company should pre-
vail, the doctrine of appropriation would crumble in this 
state. There would be no such thing as a prior right. Sub-
sequent appropriators with their larger and more efficient 
pumping equipment could draw the water out of the basin 
so that the static head pressure is so low that the cost of 
bringing the water to the surface is prohibitive to the prior 
appropriator, and then the subsequent appropriator will be 
able to obtain all the water from the prior appropriator 
without paying a cent therefor. If we take Utah Lake for 
an example, it is a matter of common knowledge that there 
is unappropriated water in Utah Lake, and that the maxi-
mum pumping lift would be less than 13 feet. Under such 
a rule, new appropriators could come in and pump water 
in extensive quantities from Utah Lake without diminish-
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ing the quantity of water necessary to satisfy the prior ap-
propriators. The subsequent appropriators could well con-
tend that the prior appropriators would have to stand their 
O\Vll expense in pumping the waters which were thereto-
fore diverted by gravity flow, and for increasing the pmnp-
ing lift on the waters theretofore pumped. Going one step 
f~er, and making a parallel with the facts of this case, 
what would preclude the subsequent appropriator from 
taking his water from Utah Lake by gravity flow without 
any cost to him and then asserting that the prior appropri-
ators should be required to install larger pumping equipment 
at their own expense, and pay the additional cost in lifting 
their water, since the maximum lift would be less than 13 
feet, and would be an economical pwnping lift. Certainly 
this Court would not condone such a principle, or even lis-
ten to the argument. Carrying the ,argument of the Irri-
gation Company to its logical conclusion, all prior approp-
riators could be required to line and water-proof their ca-
nals and ditches or place the same in pipe lines at their own 
expense in order that the carrier water may be conserved 
and utilized by subsequent appropriators without any cost 
to them whatever. We submit that the trial court did not 
err in holding that under the facts of this the Fowkes have 
a vested right in their means of diversion by artesian pres-
sure, and that any expense in the alteration of such means 
of diversion must be borne by the subsequent appropriator. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING ITS 
ORDER REQUIRING REPLACElVIENT OF THE WATER, 
IN THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THE 
QUANTITY OF WATER APPROPRIATED BY THE VA-
RIOUS PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NUMBER 3770, 
TO SUPPORT THE ORDER FOR REPLACEMENT. 
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The Irrigation Company contends that the Fowkes did 
not prove the quantity of water to which tlhey are entitled. 
The I·rrigation Company does not deny that the Fowkes 
have made a valid appropriation from each of their wells. 
There is no issue made that the priority of the appropria-
tions from each well has not been proved, nor that the acre-
ages irrigated, the number of persons served with domes-
tic water, nor the number and kind of stock supplied with 
stockwatering have not been proved. Yet, each and every 
one of these elements of the appropriations by the Fowkes 
were proved by the undergrormd water claims. The Irri-
gation Company singles out only the quantity of water ap-
propriated, and claims that the same has not been proved 
The sole issue, therefore, is whether the WldergroWld wa-
ter claims of the Fowkes are prima facie evidence of the 
rights stated therein. Underground water claims covering 
each of the Fowkes wells were received in evidence (Pl. Ex. 
1). The Irrigation Company put on no evidence to rebut 
the facts stated in any of the underground water claims. 
During the 1935legislature, Section 73-5-10, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, was enacted for the purpose of making a 
matter of record all rights to the use of underground water 
which had been acquired by use prior to March 22, 1935. 
(Laws 1935, Chapter 105, Page 200). That portion of the 
first sentence of the original act quoted on page 29 of the 
Irrigation Company's brief leaves out a very important part 
thereof. The first sentence reads as follows: 
"Within one year after the date of the approval of this 
act, all claimants to rights to the use of underground 
water shall file notice of such claim or claims, with the 
State Engineer on forms furnished by him, setting 
forth such information as the State Engineer may re-
quire, including but not limited to the following:" 
(Emphasis OW'S) 
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The last paragraph of the f,oregoing act made failw-e 
to file notice of such claims prima facie evidence of intent 
to aJbandon the claimed right. In 1937, Section 73-5-11, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was enacted for the purpose 
of extending the time within which to file such undergronnd 
water claims, and in addition thereto, contained a provision 
to allow the State Engineer to withdraw fees for filing such 
claims, deposited in the general fund for the purpose of de-
fraying expenses incurred by the State Engineer in survey-
ing the location of the wells covered by such underground 
water claims (Laws of 1937, Chapter 130, Page 243). Sec-
tion 73-5-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, has since been 
amended four different times to extend the time within 
which to file underground water claims, and has validated 
the filing of all such claims filed since 1935. 
In 1949, Section 73-5-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
was enacted to make provision for making a matteT of ,rec-
ord of all rights to the use of water both surface and un-
derground (Laws of 1949, Chapter 97, Section 3). In an 
effort to eliminate the duplication in the provision of Sec-
tion 73-5-11, UtaJh Code Annotated, 1953, and Section 73-5-
13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, making a matter of record 
the rights to the use of underground water and for the fur-
ther purpose of extending the time indefinitely within which 
to file such claims (29th Biennial Report of State Engineer, 
Page 76), Section 73-5-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and 
Section 73-5-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, were repealed 
in their entirety, and Section 73-5-13, Utah Code Annota-
ted~ 1953, was amended by the laws of 1955, ·Chapter 160, 
Page 312, The last paragraph of Section 73-5-13, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended in 1955, now reads as follows: 
"Such notices of claim, or claims, as provided in this 
Section, shall be prima facie evidence of claimed right 
or rights therein described." 
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The trial court ruled ~t since the foregoing ·statute was 
a rule of evidence enacted by the legislature, the effect 
therof was retroactive and the Fowkes claims were 
entitled to the benefit of the statute. On page 33 of the 
Irrigation Company's ~brief, it is conceded that the legis-
lature has such rule making power. The Irrigation Com-
pany argues, however, that since the Fowkes claims were 
filed pursuant to the 1935 statute, that such claims are not 
entitled to the prima facie effect given them under the 1955 
amendment. With this argument we cannot agree. In the 
first place, the 1935 Act contained substantially the same 
language as the 1955 Amendment in that it required the 
claimant to set forth "* * * such information as the State 
Engineer may require''. In the second place the identical 
form of undergrOWld water claims has been used since the 
1949 Enactment and the 1955 Amendment as was used pur-
suant to the original act of 1935. In the third place, com-
plete chaos and confusion would result if the undergrotmd 
water claims filed pursuant to the original act of 1935 were 
given different evidentiary effect from those filed pursu-
ant to the 1949 enactment, and still a different evidentiary 
effect given to those filed pursuant to the 1955 amendment. 
It could well be that the legislature anticipated the confu-
sion which would come about with the co-existence of the 
original act of 1935, and the 1949 enactment covering the 
same claims to underground water. For this reason, the 
original act of 1935 was repealed and Section 73-5-13, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, was amended in 1955 to include all 
claims within one statute. 
The purpose of the statute in giving the prima facie 
effect to such claims is to protect the old rights. This be-
comes apparent when it is observed that the older the rights 
become the more difficult it becomes to prove such rights 
by the testimony of witnesses. It gives reward to those 
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daimants who were diligent B:Jld ~ed their_ elaims pursuant 
to the original act of 1935. It would be somewhat absurd 
to argue that those claimants who were dilatory and did 
not file their c;laims for twenty ·years after the original act 
of 1935 should be rewarded by making their ~claims prima 
facie evidence of the rights claimed and penalize rthose who 
were diligent in filing their claims pursuant to the original 
act of 1935 by making their elaims only prima facie evi-
dence of what they claim. In our judgment, the argument 
of the Irrigation Company that claims filed pursuant to the 
original aot of 1935 are prima facie evidence of what the 
claimant claims is meaningless. If such claims are limirted 
to that effect, they are nort worth the paper upon which they 
are written. We believe that such claims are worth some-
thing more than that, and so did the legislasture when in 
1955 ilt made such elaims prima facie evidence of the rights 
claimed therein. 
The Irrigation Company goes into great detail discus-
sing Section 73-3-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The fore-
going Section applies exclusively rto proof of appropriation 
of water rights which have been initiated by filing an appli-
cation to appropriate the same with rthe State Engineer, 
and we do not believe that the Irrigation Company con-
tends otherwise. There can be no question about the fact 
that the foregoing statute does not apply to elaims -cover-
ing either surface or underground water. 
The Fowkes made out a prima facie case of their ap-
propriation not only with respect to priority, acreage irri-
gated, persons and stock supplied, hut also with respect to 
the quantity of water by placing in evidence their under-
ground water claims filed with the State Engineer. The 
Irrigation Company put in no evidence to rebut the prima 
facie proof. On page 34 of the Irrigation Company's brief, 
it is asserted that the flows are obviously estimated. Plain-
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tiffs John L. Fowkes and Heber J. Fowkes, who are the 
original claim.a.nts under eight of the eleven underground 
water claims, testified as witnesses in this case, and the Ir-
rigation Company had ample opportunity by cross exami-
nation to determine whether or not such flows were esti-
mates. This the Irrigation Company neglected to do for 
reasons known only to itself, therefore it should not now 
be heard to complain. 
A further aspect of this problem becomes apparent 
when it is observed that the Fowkes wells ceased flowing as 
a resulrt of the wrongful act of the Irrigation Company. It 
caused the Fowkes' well to cease flowing and destroys any 
present means of measuring the flows of water therefrom. 
It then asserts thaJt the Fowkes should not be entitled to 
recover because they cannot prove the flow of warter from 
their wells. This is consistent with the argument hereto-
fore asserted by the Irrigation Company that the late com-
er should be rewarded for his wrongful acts. Such a rule 
would leave the door open to subsequent appropriators rto 
come in and rtake water from the basin, cause the wells of 
the prior appropriators to cease flowing, and then be im-
mune from liability because the prior appropriator could 
not prove the flow of water from his well prior to the 
wrongful act of the subsequent appropriator. 
We submit that the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3770 
proved their prior appropriations by placing in evidence 
their underground water claims which were admittedly filed 
and recorded in the office of the State Engineer. In sup-
port thereof, we again call attention to the case of Hanson 
vs. Salt Lake City, supra, wherein, on page 261 of the Re-
porter, it is stated as follows: 
"• • • We, therefore, conclude and hold • * * *that 
by filing his (Hanson's) claims to such right to use 
such waters in accordance with the 1935 Statute, he 
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has established that right with a priority dating from 
his first use.'' 
We further submit ~that the trial court did not err in 
entering its order requiring replacement of the water since 
there is proof of the quantity of water appropriated by the 
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3770 to support an order for re-
placement. 
POINT ill 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING THE 
IRRIGATION COMPANY AND ANDREWS TO EACH 
REPLACE HALF THE WATER, AND THERE IS EVI-
DENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT AN APPOR-
TIONMENT OF REPLACEMENT COST, AND THE 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
ONLY CAUSE FOR DIMUNITION IN THE PLAINTIFF'S 
WELL WAS INTERFERENCE BY ANDREWS AND 
THE IRRIGATION COMPANY. 
We shall endeavor to follow the form of the Irrigation 
Company brief by discussing under Boint 3 the last three 
points covered by its designation of points on appeal. 
(a) The Trial Court Did Not Ignore The Whole Pri-
ority System. 
The trial,court found that the drilling and use of water 
from rthe Andrews pump well and from the Irrigation Com-
pany wells have interferred with and have interrupted the 
flow of water from the eighteen flowing wells and springs 
having prior rights, and have reduced the pressure in said 
flowing wells and in the springs to the point that effective 
future use thereof will require the installation of pumps 
or other means of securing the water therefrom (Finding 
No. 12, P. 168). 
The problem is somewhat complicated by the fact rthat 
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Andrews owns seven of the eighteen flowing wells and An-
drews failed to sustain the burden of proof to show the net 
effect orf the interference caused to their flowing wells and 
springs by the liTigation Company flowing wells as op.. 
posed to and distinguished from the effect caused by their 
own pwnp well (Finding No. 15, P. 169). Insofar as Fowkes 
are concerned, both Andrews and the Irrigation Company 
are wrongdoers and Fowkes are entitled to relief both as 
against the Irrigation Company and Andrews. Charvoz 
vs. Bonneville Irrigation District, 120 Utah 480, 235 Pac. 
2d 780. The problem then ·becomes simply one of appor-
tioning the costs of replacement between Andrews and the 
Irrigation Company and the apportionment of such costs 
is a dispute between them, and should be of no concern to 
Fowkes. The burden of showing the apportionment was 
either on the Irrigation Company or Andrews or both. 
Either or both of them failed to sustain the burden of show-
ing an apportionment different from thart found by the trial 
court. 
The trial court foood that Andrews pump well will 
pump approximately six second feet of water (Finding No. 
4, P. 167) and the Irrigation Company's flowing wells flow 
2.74 second feet of water (Finding No. 5, P. 167). The total 
withdrawal from the basin by the five Irrigation Company 
wells for one year at the foregoing rate of flmv would be 
1980 acre feet (R. 57). During 1954 the Andrews pump 
well was started in May and ended approximately the first 
of November (Vol. 2, P. 103). The period of withdrawal 
would be approximately five and one-half months, or one 
hundred sixty-five days. The total quantity of water with-
drawn from the basin during that period at the rarte of six 
second feet would be approximately 1,980 acre feet. It is 
apparent that the tot:al wirthdrawal by the Irrigation Com-
pany flowing wells for a twelve month period would be 
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equal to the total withdra"\¥al by ·the Andrews pump well 
during the irrigation season. The trial court, therefore, 
apportioned the cost of replacemenrt equally among An-
drews and the Irrigation Company. Such apportionment is 
supported by the evidence, and in a:bsence of a showing by 
either the Irrigation Company or 'Andrews of a better ap-
portionment of the replacement costs, the order of the trial 
court should stand. 
On page 35 of the Irrigation Company's brief it com-
plains that the trial eourt ignored the difference in priori-
ties between the Irrigation Company flowing wells and the 
Andrews pump well. One solution to this problem would 
be to require the Irrigation Company, having the latest pri-
oritY, to stand the total cost of replacement. We believe, 
however, that this is a dispute between the Irrigation Com-
pany and Andrews. We have no dispute with the findings 
of the trial court that Andrews has declared it to be his 
intention to drill another well and to withdraw an addi-
tional six second feet. Nor do we have any dispute with the 
findings of the trial court that the Irrigation Company is 
granted the right to pump its wells. The Fowkes means o[ 
diversion has been depleted and a further lowering of the 
water table would ~be .immaterial. It should make no dif-
ference to the Fowkes whether the water table is lowered 
an additional one hundred feet by Andrews and the Irriga-
tion Company so long as the water to which Fowkes are 
entitled to use is replaced to them. . 
(b) It is Immaterial That Others Are Withdrawing 
Water from the Basin Under Junior Priorities In the Vi-
cinity of Nephi Since Any Possible Interference Caused 
Thereby is Very Remote and Speculative . 
. We do not believe thast rthe evidence conclusively shows 
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that developments in the vicinity of Nephi have a direct ef. 
feet on the artesian basin from which the Fowkes have 
appropriated their water, and it was not error for the court 
to ignore the Nephi development. In a somewhat desper .. 
ate effort to place the blame of interference on someone 
else, the Irrigation Company presented some evidence of 
the drilling of wells on the Salt Creek Fan west of Nephi, 
which is approximately ten miles sourth from the wells in 
question (Volume 2, P. 62). Mr. Mayo was asked directly 
whether in his opinion the drilling of the wells in the Nephi 
area has any effect on the Fowkes wells (R. 21). His an-
swer was as follows: 
"Well, from what information we have in the State 
Engineer's Office and from an appreciation of the com-
plexity of the subsurface geology and the ·hydrauli<S 
of the aquifers that would appear to exist in the valley, 
there doesn't seem to be any likelihood that any recent 
development m the Nephi area could materially affect 
the wells in the vicinity of the Mona Reservoir.'' 
Mr. Gardner expressed his opinion that the source of 
supply to the Fowkes wells does not come directly from any 
sources to the south of North Canyon (R. 44) . The Irri-
gation Company's own witness, Dr. Hansen, testified that 
any effect on the pressure in the Fmvkes wells caused by 
the development or drilling of wells in the Nephi area would 
be very remote (R. 159). He further testified that any in-
ter-connection of underground water between the Salt Crook 
Fan and the fan on which the Fowkes wells are locaJted 
would have to be through the coalesced fingers of the alluvi-
al fan and that the material at ·the place where they coalesce 
is finer than it is further back up the fan and the restric-
tion on the movement of the water would be greater (R. 
168). Therefore, two wells on the same fan would affect 
each other much more noticeably than a well on another 
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fan which might coalesce through this fine material (R. 
168) . Dr. Hansen further testified that it was possible that 
the fault which traverses the valley ,in the vicinity of the 
Burriston Springs could force to the surface all underground 
water moving to the north from Nephi (R. 196). All of rthe 
foregoing evidence is fwther supported by Pl. Exh. PlO, 
which contained three separate hydrographs of three wells 
spaced between Nephi and Mona. The hydrographs are 
explained by Mr. Mayo (R. 16-17). The top line represents 
the hydrograph of a well situated west of Mona. The mid-
dle line represents the hydrograph of a well situated mid-
way between Mona and Nephi. The bottom line represents 
the hydrograph of a well situated west of Nephi. Mr. Mayo 
testified that the foregoing hydrographs when considered 
with the information on plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 ·show some 
characteristics that would indicate that the ground water 
development in the Nephi area is not showing its influence 
in the vicinity of the Star Ranch (R. 28). 
We submit, therefore, that the evidence shows that 
any development of water in the Nephi area is immaterial, 
and that any possible interference which might be caused 
thereby is very remote and speculative. We fwther sub-
mit that the trial court did not err in concluding that the 
only cause for dimunition in the Fowkes' wells was the in-
terference by Andrews pump well and the Irrigation Com-
pany wells. 
(c) Any Evidence That Shows That Mona Reservoir 
Would Receive The Total Overflow From The Basin Is Im-
material And The Trial Court Properly Ignored This. 
In one last futile attempt to justify its wrongful act, 
the liTigation Company asserts that the Mona Reservoir 
picks up the total overflow from the ground water basin. 
In the first .Place, ~their assertion is based upon supposition 
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and conjecture. The only direct testimony of the water of 
any Particular spring reaching the Mona Reservoir was by 
John Roundy with respect to the Andrews spring (R. 255). 
Max Thomas testified that there are sources of recharge in 
the form of springs and surface runoff to the Mona Reser-
voir, but he didn't state where such springs were located 
(Vol. 2, P. 87). There is no evidence to show that the res-
ervoir picks up the total overflow 'from the artesian basin. 
This may or may not be a geological fact. Any evidence 
in support of such a fact in the record is based upon gen-
eral opinion of the usual conditions and is not based upon 
any detailed investigation. In any event, there is no evi-
dence in the record to show the quantity of such overflow. 
The mere fact that the Irrigation Company drilled five large 
wells to develop water from the basin defeats its own ar-
gument. Otherwise, why would the Irrigation Company 
spend between $41,000.00 and $45,000.00 (Vol. 2, P. 82), 
$15,000.00 of which was borrowed from the Utah Water 
and Power Board interest free (Vol. 2, P. 84) to drill the 
five large irrigation wells if it was getting the water any-
way by overflow into Mona Reservoir. 
We submit that any evidence that the Mona Reservoir 
would receive the overflow from the basin is immaterial, 
and the trial court did not err in ignoring this. 
POINT IV 
THE DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT INSOFAR 
AS IT AWARDED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND OR-
DERED REPLACEMENT TO FOWKES WAS PROPER. 
In appellant Andrews' brief, they designate three dif-
ferent points on appeal in Case Number 3770. Fowkes are 
primarily concerned with the points designated therein as 
Point 2 and Point 6, and will endeavor to answer both un-
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der the common he~ding of this point as designated above. 
Fowkes wholeheartedly concur with the ar~ent presen-
ted under Point 5 designated by appellant Andrews. Al-
though the fact that the Irrigation Company wastes 50% 
of the water which it diverts from the underground basin 
becomes immaterial to Fowkes under the relief granted by 
the trial coUrt, we believe that this Court should keep such 
fact in mind in considering appellant Irrigation Company's 
argument under Point 1 of its brief. 
Fowkes are somewhat in a neutral comer in the con-
troversy between Andrews and the Irrigation Company with 
respect to how the cost of replacement shall be apportioned. 
The evidence conclusively shows that both the Andrews 
Pump Well and the five Irrigation Company flowing wells 
have interferred with and have reduced the pressure in the 
Fowkes wells and spring, such that they will have to be 
pumped, and the trial court so found (Finding No. 12, P. 
168). Once that was shown there can :be no dispute about 
the right of Fowkes to recover against both the Irrigation 
Company and Andrews. We believe that the burden was 
upon either or both the Irrigation Company and Andrews 
to show the relative interference caused by their wells to 
the Fowkes wells. It might well be that as between the two 
the burden was upon the liTigation Company to make the 
showing, as is argued in Andrews' brief. Since either one 
or both have failed to prove their relative interference, we 
believe that the apportionment ordered by ,the trial court 
should stand, since there is ample evidence in the record to 
support it. As pointed out in our discussion under Point 
Nwnber ITI herein, it would seem that the equitable manner 
in which to apportion such costs rshould be based upon the 
relative quantities of water withdrawn from this basin, since 
,1Jhat is the cause in fact of the reduction of the static head 
pressure. We have demonstrated that Andrews ~and the 
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l:rrigation Company annually withdraw an equal quantity 
of water from this basin, being approximately 1980 acre 
feet each year. In view of the foregoing, there exists in the 
rec~ ample evidence for apportioning the costs equally, 
Which the trial court did. 
Andrews argue and the Irrigation Company makes 
some claim that the court ignored ·the fact that the Irriga-
tion Company's flowing wells have a la!ter priority than the 
Andrews pump well Certainly the Irrigation Company 
should have no cause to complain, since it could well be, as 
Andrews argue, that the Irrigation Company, having the 
lata9t: priority, should stand the whole expense. To answer 
the argument of Andrews, if there devolves upon us a duty 
to do so, iJt must be borne in mind that the rights of the Ir-
rigation Company in the five flowing wells, and the righ~ 
<;>f An·drews in the Andrews Pump Well are evidenced only 
by approved applications to appropriate water which pres. 
ently are merely an inchoate righrt which may ripen into a 
vested right upon compliance with the statutory procedure. 
McGarry vs. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P. 2d 288. It is 
conceivable and very possible that either of the applications 
might lapse and cause a reduction in priority for various 
reasons at any time until certificate of appropriation is is-
sued (Section 73-3-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). It 
could well be that because of this uncertainty the trial court 
gave very little weight to the present relative priorities of 
th Andrews Pump Well and the IrrigaJtion Company flow-
ing wells. 
The Fowkes merely want the water to which they have 
shown they are entitled, and it makes no difference to them 
whether they receive it by a restoration of the artesian con-
ditions, or whether it is replaced to them by the subsequent 
appropriators who have destroyed those conditions. They 
have n.o practical concern as to how the costs or repJ.a.re. 
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ment are to be apportioned unless the inability to apportion 
such eosts should defeat the right of Fowkes to recover. 
Since there has been no showing by either the Irrigation 
Company or Andrews of a different basis for apportioning 
the replacement eosts, and since the evidence supports the 
basis found by the trial,court, we think the order of the trial 
court should stand. We submit, therefore, that the Decree 
of the trial court, insofar as it awarded injunctive relief and 
ordered replacement to Fowkes, is supported by the evi-
dence and was wholly proper. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINA-
TION THAT UNDER THE FACfS OF TillS CASE 
FOWKES HAD A DUTY TO MITIGATE THEIR DAM-
AGES AND IN HOLDING THAT FOWKES ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR DAMAGES FOR LOSS 
OF CROPS AND FOR HAULING WATER BECAUSE 
THEY FAILED TO MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES. 
The trial court found that Fowkes suffered a pecuniary 
loss of $1500.00 for crops not grown and for hauling water 
during the period in controversy (Finding No. 16, P. 169). 
The trial court further found that Fowkes could have miti-
gated their damages by taking the necessary steps to se-
cure water which was still available from the underground 
area during the existence of this controversy, and, by rea-
son thereof, Fowkes were not entitled to recover damages 
for loss of ~crops and for hauling water (Finding No. 16, P. 
169). We have pointed out under our Statement of Facts 
that it would cost approximately $7,700.00 to drill and equip 
a well adequate to replace 800 gallons per minute of water 
to the Fowkes. In addition thereto, there would be the cost 
of a suitable transformer and the cost of power for pump.. 
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ing. It would cost at least $6,950.00 to test pump and equip 
each existing well with a suitable pump. In addition there-
to, there would be the cost of suitable transformer and the 
cost of pumping. According to the testimony of Mr. Mad-
sen, a witness for the Water and Power Board, the total 
cost to equip the existing Fowkes wells with adequate facili-
ties would he $8,464.00. The trial court, therefore, ruled 
in effect that Fowkes had a duty to expend between $6,-
950.00 and $8,464.00 to mitigate $1500.00 damages. From 
this ruling, the Fowkes filed their cross appeal. 
The rule of mitigation of damages adopted in Utah 
is well stated in the case of Jankele vs. Texas Company, 88 
Utah 325, 54 P. 2d, 425. On page 428 it is stated: 
''* * * One who is injured in this person or property 
by wrongful or negligent acts of 'another is bound to 
exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid loss 
or to minimize the resulting damage and to the extent 
rthat his damages are the result of his active and un-
reasonable enhancement thereof, or are due to his fail-
ure to exercise such care and diligence he cannot re-
cover. One who has been injured by the wrongful or 
negligent acts of another is bound to protect himself, 
if he can do so with reasonable exertion, or at trifling 
expense and he can recover from the delinquent party 
only such damages as he could not, with reasonable ef-
fort, have avoided." 
To tlle same effect is 25 CJS, Damages, Section 33, 
Page 499; 15 Am. Jur. Damages, Section 27, Page 420 to 
422 inelusive. It is pointed out in the Jankele case that the 
efforts which the injured party must make to avoid the 
consequences of the wrongful act need only be reasonable 
under ·the circumstances of the particular case, and· his duty 
is limited by the rules of common sense and fair dealing. 
Failure to e·xercise reasonable care to m.inim.ize damages 
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is not a complete bar, but merely goes to the amount of 
damages recoverable. The efforts required of the injured 
party to minimize his damages include a reasonable expen-
diture of money, which he may recover as a part of his 
~amages. He is not r~quired to incur large. expenses, since 
he must protect himself if he can do so at "trifling expense." 
In 15 Am. Jur. Damages, Page 425, it is pointed out that 
the word "trifling" has reference to the situation of the par-
ties. It means a sum which is trifling in comparison with 
the consequential damages which are sought to be recov-
ered in the particular case. It is apparent without further 
argument that the trial court erred in concluding that 
Fowkes had a duty to expend a sum of between $6,950.00 
to $8,464.00 to mitigate $1,500.00 damages . 
. It is noted here that plaintiff, Heber J. Fowkes, had 
to haul water in 1956 for his domestic needs (R. 114). He 
made 32 trips, or a total of 256 miles (R. 115) . Each trip 
took an hour and a half, or a total of 48 hours (R. 115). 
The reasonable value to hire someone to drive the tractor 
to Mona and back was at least $1.00 per hour (R. 116). 
Asstuning a cost of 10c per mile as reasonable and $1.00 per 
hour for labor, the reasonable cost of hauling water was 
$73.70. There can be no doubt about the fact that the 
foregoing ·costs were incurred to mitigate the damages, yet 
the trial court refused to award any part thereof. 
In 15 Am. Jur. Damages, Page 423, the rule is stated 
that in cases of intentional torts the rule of mitigation of 
damages does not apply. It is further pointed out in 15 Am. 
Jur. Damages, Section 41, Page 441, that in some states 
the rule requiring one to minimize his damages does not 
apply in cases of intentional or positive and continuous 
torts and that if there is an illegal invasion of one's prop-
erty rights and an intentional or positive and continuous 
tort the injured party may recover whatever damage he 
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SUStained, even fuough by the exercise of ordinary care and 
diligence he could have avoided tl!.e same. The foregoing 
is especially true where trespassers have profited by their 
torts (Shannon vs. McNabb, 29 ·Okla. 829, 120 P. 268). 
In the instant case the defendants diverted water from their 
wells for aproximately two years, lmowing that they caused 
the wells of plaintiff to cease flowing, yet they continued 
to do so and used the water to ·grow and mature their crops 
while the crops of the Fowkes burned up. 
The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect 
that in action for damages arising out of eitller breach of 
contract or tort, the burden is upon rthe party whose wrong-
ful act caused the damages complained of to prove any-
thing in diminution of the damages, or in other words, that 
the damages were lessened or might have been lessened by 
reasonable diligence on the part of the aggrieved party. 
(Mitigation of Damages-Burden of Proof, 134 ALR 242). 
In the case now before the Court, the defendants offered no 
evidence to show that the Fowkes could have taken rea-
sonable measures at ''trifling'' expense to minimize their 
damages. The only evidence which they presented was to 
show that the elevation of the water surface was not more 
than 8.5 feet below the ground surface. The defendants 
failed to susta.in their burden, and the trial court should 
have so held and awarded Fowkes ·their damages. On the 
other hand, the Fowkes presented evidence to show that the 
cost to mitigate such damages would be between $6,950.00 
~and $8,464.00. If the Fowkes had made such expenditures 
they ·would have enhanced their damages instead of miti-
gating them. We seriously doubt that the trial court would 
have awarded Fowkes as damages such ~nditures if 
made, since such expenditures would grea!tly exceed their 
actuall damages found by the trial court. In addition to the 
foregoing, we invite the Court's attention to the rule stated 
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in 25 CJS Damages, Section 33, Page 502, wherein it is sta-
ted that plaintiffs' lack of funds to meet the situation pre-
sented may excuse efforts to lessen the injury. If the in-
come tax returns of the plaintiffs Fowkes (Exhibits 015, 
16, and 19) demonstrate anything in this case, they demon-
straJte the lack of financial ability of the Fowkes to make 
such large expenditures. 
We further invite the Court's attention to the uncer-
tainty which existed during the period of the controversy 
as to whether the artesian conditions would return. Can 
it be said that a reasonable man, upon first discovering a 
reduc1Jion in the flow of water from his well, would immedi-
ately purchase expensive pumping equipmenrt, motors and 
other facilities to pump his well? We think not. Immedi-
ately upon observing the reduction in flow from their wells, 
the Fowkes protested to the State Engineer and exhausted 
theiT administrative remedies in hope that their means of 
diversion would be protected by the State Engineer. When 
the State Engineer gave them no relief, they immediately 
commenced this action. We submit that the Fowkes did 
everything that could be reasonably expected of them un-
der the circumstances. We further submit that the trial 
court erred in finding that under the facts of this case 
Fowkes had a duty to mitigate their damages, and further 
erred in denying Fowkes their damages because of their 
failure to mitigate, and that the decree of the trial court 
should be reversed, and remanded with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Fowkes and against defendants Irri-
gation Company and Andrews for $1,500.00. 
CONCLUSION 
The main controversy presented by this appeal is a 
flowing well vs. flowing well dispute. The issue to be re-
solved is whether the Irrigation Company, as the junior 
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tors Fowkes of their means of diversion, and to utilize the 
same means to divert its own water. In defense of ia 
wrongful act, the Irrigation Company asserts that the wa--
ter in the Fowkes wells is within 8.5 from the grolUld sur-
face, so the Fowkes ought to be required to install pump-
ing equipment at their own expense to get it. Yet the Irri-
gation Company, with clear conscience, takes the same ar-
tesian press~e which it asserts it had the right to take away 
from Fowkes because it is an unreasonable means, and use 
it to divert its own water, without any .cost to it whatever. 
The Irrigation Company further asserts that it should not 
be required to pay the cost of altering Fowkes' means of 
diversion, because to do so would follow a principle of law 
which would require a junior appropriator in Milford to lift 
40,000 acre feet of water for the prior appropriators before 
he could use one acre foot for himself. The Irrigation Com-
pany ignores the fact that the very reason which it urges 
in support of its argument does not exist in this case. 
To adopt the rule asserted by the Irrigation Company 
would require this Court to overrule every case which it has 
decided on this facet of our Utah Water Law.. There would 
be no such thing as a prior right. The doctrine of appropri-
ation which has always jealously protected the prior ap-
propriator would have to be discarded. This we believe the 
Court will not do. Upon this determination could well rest 
the rights of many o\vners of established rights to divert 
underground water by means of wells. Great injustice could 
result to not only the Fowkes in this case, but to many of 
the owners of established \vate:r rights if this Court takes 
the wrong road at the "Cross Roads" suggested by the Irri-
gation Company. We strongly urge that this Court apply 
the principles of water law which it has time and time again 
announced as being correct. 
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It follows without argument that the rule of mitigation 
does not require one to expend from between $6,950.00 and 
$8,464.00 to mitigate $1,500.00 damages. We submit that 
the trial court erred in this respect. 
We respectfully submit that the evidence supports the 
decree of the trial court insofar as it awarded Fowkes in-
junctive relief, and ordered replacement of water to Fowkes, 
and should be affirmed accordingly. The decree of the trial 
court should, however, be reversed and remanded, wirth in-
structions to enter judgment in favor of Fowkes and 
against defendants, Irrigation Company and Andrews, for 
$1,500.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PIDLLIP V. CHRISTENSON 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
for CHRISTENSON, NOVAK & PAULSON 
Attorneys for Respondents and Cross 
Appellants, Fowkei 
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